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Summary  findings
Voucher privatization was expected to result in widely  with significant stakes can readily compare managers'
dispersed ownership with little effect on firms'  performance and remove underperforming  executives
governance. But in the first wave of privatization, more  and can counterbalance the control of management and
than 70 percent of Czech vouchers went to investment  employees. Funds can also effectively monitor firms on
funds and the 10 largest Czech and Slovak investment  behalf of groups of small investors.
funds (surveyed for this study) acquired roughly half of  After privatization, most Czech assets are now owned
all voucher points.  by funds affiliated with banks. In market economies, a
And the large funds can influence corporate  close relationship between banks and enterprises may be
governance. A fund holding large stakes (up to 20  seen as a conflict of interest. In transition economies ---
percent) in a single enterprise  can appoint directors to  where information  costs are high because corporate
the board, help select management, and otherwise  performance is not transparent  and where collateral-
monitor corporate decision-making.  based lending remains fraught with uncertainty - banks
A fund's actual role depends on the sponsoring  and funds have spontaneously developed a relationship
institution's  or individual's incentive structure.  Foreign  as a way for banks to get information  about firm
bank-sponsored and nonbank  funds are stronger  performance. Bank-sponsored funds reduce banks'
corporate monitors than funds sponsored by domestic  information  and monitoring  costs and hence lending risk
banks.  and costs. They also facilitate the informal workout  of
Banks and investment funds lack the skills and  problem loans.
incentives to initiate corporate  restructuring, but funds
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1.  Introduction
It is widely acknowledged that privatization of state-owned companies is one of the key
reforms for transition economies. What is less clear is the best design for privatization, its
advantages and drawbacks and its interdependencies with other reform elements such as
the role of capital markets . One of the most discussed privatization strategies implemented
in  a  few  countries  in  transition  can be  summarized  under  'mass  privatization',  mainly
through the use of vouchers or investment points to be distributed among the population.
The voucher scheme has often been criticized as merely a formal method of privatization
without actual impact on the governance structure of a company. It is argued that voucher
privatization results in dispersed ownership and therefore weak monitoring of firms that
require strong owners in order to  restructure and turn around companies  in increasingly
competitive markets (van Brabant, 1990 and 1991, Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1991).
However, in the former CSFR, the spontaneous creation of financial intermediaries in the
form of investment privatization funds (IPFs) was a first step towards more concentration
of ownership rights (Frydman et al., 1993). Today, IPFs are the most important players in
equity markets in the Czech and Slovak Republics.
What lessons can be  drawn from  more than one year of activity  of IPFs in  the Czech
Republic? Two methodological approaches to this  problem are possible.  In a bottom-up
I There might be different meanings of the term 'capital markets'. Here capital markets can be
broadly divided into equity and debt instruments,  where equity instruments mainly consist of
markets  in ownership  rights. Debt instruments  deal with all kinds of external  finance  coming either
from banks in the form of loans or related financing or through the issue of debt on capital
markets.2
approach one would analyze the outcome of IPFs' activity, namely the performance of the
2 enterprises themselves
This study will use an alternative approach in which investment funds as new institutions
in emerging capital markets are central. This gives rise to several questions:
- How can the behavior of funds be explained?
- Why do certain funds do what they do?
- What is the economic and legal environment in which investment funds act?
- What  is  the  role  of  funds as  institutional  players  in  restructuring  firms  after
privatization?
To  answer these questions,  this  study will analyze the top  ten investment privatization
funds that emerged in the first wave of privatization in the Czech Republic and discusses
the main results of the fund survey3.
2.  An overview of the process of voucher privatization in the Czech Republic
A total of 1,491 companies with a book value of CSK277.7 billion ($10 billion) have been
privatized in the first privatization wave, which started in 1991 when Czechoslovakia was
4 still united4. While privatization slowed down in Slovakia after the split, the second wave
has been carried out in the Czech Republic (see Table 1).
2 The idea behind  this reasoning  is that if enterprises  perform  well then the owners  must have done
a good  job, too. Although  this kind of reasoning  might be true in some cases, it would be difficult
to  separate the  influence of  owners on enterprise performance from  other factors such as
competition in product markets. In addition, this kind of approach would require a considerable
data set on enterprises  which is still difficult  to obtain at this time.
3 Fund interviews  have been  carried out in July and August 1994.
4 For a detailed analysis of the privatization  process in former Czechoslovakia  see Svejnar and
Singer  (1994) and Triska (1994).3
In the beginning of the first wave the interest of the population in the process was fairly
low. Only when some funds started aggressive marketing campaigns did people start to buy
voucher booklets containing 1,000 investment points each (Brom and Orenstein, 1993, 23).
In the end 75% (78% in the Czech Republic) of the eligible population participated. This
means that every citizen investing a voucher book received on average 32.4 shares (with a
book value of CSK1,000 for each share).
Table 1: Key figures from the two waves of voucher privatization  in the Czech
Republic
First  wave  Second  wave
Former  CSFR  Czech  Republic  Czech  Republic
Number  of companies  involved  1491  943  867
Total  book  value  privatized  (CSK  billion)  278  201  155
Eligible  population  participating  (in %)  75  78  80
Number  of investment  funds  competing  439  1/  264  353
Share  of points  allocated  to IPFs  (in %)  71.4  72.5  64
1/  but only  344  founders  since  some  sponsors  founded  several  funds.
Source:  Mejstrik  et  al. (1994);  Mejstrik  (1994).
The distribution  of shares was carried  out  in  five bidding  rounds 5. Before the bidding
started, in the so-called zero round, people could decide to either invest on their own or
transfer their points to one of the newly-founded investment privatization funds (IPFs). In
the zero round, 6.22 million people 6 transferred 6.1 billion voucher points  to IPFs. This
represents over  71% of  all  points  available  in  the first  wave.  The remaining  29%  of
participating citizens made individual choices about how to invest (see Figure 1).
There are various reasons for the success of funds in Czech voucher privatization:
- funds were thought to  have better access to non-public information, and thus, to
select more attractive enterprises,
- funds offer a diversified portfolio which limits risk,
5For  a more detailed analysis of the Czech privatization  see, for example, Mladek (1994) or
Kotbra  (1993).  For an assessment  ofthe bidding  process  see Shafik (1993  and 1994).
65.8  million  people  transferred  all and another  420,000  part of their points  to IPFs.4
some  funds offered to  buy back  fund shares for several times the amount each
voucher holder had to pay for a voucher book.
Figure 1: Key results of the investment  process  in the first wave of privatization
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3.  Survey of Czech voucher funds
The  analysis  tries  to  shed  some  light  on  the  ownership  patterns  that  emerged  after
privatization. In order to get a better  understanding on this issue, the set of the top ten
investment funds which emerged in the first wave in the Czech Republic are analyzed. The
ten biggest Czech funds represent more than 43% of the entire market, measured in number
of investment points acquired, and more than 60% of the market held by funds (see Table
7 2)7.
In choosing the top ten funds for an analysis about investment funds, it is not suggested
that big funds behave similarly. On the contrary, very distinctive patterns can be observed
7 The ten biggest  Czech  and Slovak  funds account  for half of all voucher  points and about 71% of
all points allocated  to funds.5
among the ten  funds in  this  survey. The reason  for choosing the top  ten funds was to
provide a set that captures a high market share. Although some smaller funds might behave
differently than the funds analyzed here, the chosen fumd set in this study is sufficiently
representative of the system as a whole during and after the privatization process to enable
conclusions about the role of funds.
In order to describe and analyze various funds, a more detailed conceptual framework shall
be provided by classifying between different types of funds.
Table 2: The top ten investment funds in the Czech Republic
Investment  fund  group  1/  %  of total  % of points
Abbreviation Full  name  points  acquired  by  funds
CS  Ceska  Sporitelna  11.1  15.6
IB  Investicni  Banka  8.4  11.9
HCC  Harvard  Capital  & Consulting  4/  7.5  10.5
KB  Komercni  Banka  5.4  7.6
CP  Ceska  Pojistovna  3.9  5.5
CA  Creditanstalt  5/  1.9  2.7
PPF  PPF  1.4  1.9
ZB  Zivnostenska  Banka  1.4  1.9
AB  Agrobanka  6/  1.3  1.8
YSE  YSE  2/  0.8  1.2
Subtotal  fund  set  43.1  60.6
Other  funds  3/  28.3  39.4
Total  funds  71.4  100.0
1/ For  bank  sponsored  funds  IPFs  are  classified  by  sponsors  (see  also  next  chapter).
2/ Due  to limited  data  coming  from  investment  fund  Bohemia  (No.  10  in  size  with  1.0%  of all the
points),  which  is the  IPF  from  Banka  Bohemia,  the  private  fund  YSE  was  included  in  our  set  of top
ten  funds.  This  change  insignificantly  influences  the  overall  importance  of the  top  ten  Czech  funds
among  all  funds  operating  in  the  Czech  Republic  (60.6%  instead  of 60.8%)
3/ of which  some  bigger  Slovak  Investment  Funds  that  invested  in  Czech  shares,  e. g. VUB  (5.8%
of total  points),  Slovenske  Investicie  (2.2%  of  total  points),  SSK  - Investment  Company  of Slovak
Savings  Bank  and  VSZ  Kosice  (2%  of total  points),  Slovenska  lnvesticni  Banka  (1.7%  of total
points)  and  Slovenska  Pojistovna  (1.4%  of total  points).  These  five  bigger  Slovak  funds  together
collected  13.1%  of all points  and  amount  to 18.2%  of total  points  invested  in  funds.
4/ includes  0.8%  of total  points  from  the  Slovak  fund  of Harvard.
5/ includes  0.3%  of total  points  from  the  Slovak  fund  of Creditanstalt.
6/ includes  0.5%  of total  points  from  the  Slovak  fund  of  Agrobanka.
Source:  Fund  interviews  and  Mejstrik  (1994).6
4.  Fund classification
Investment funds were founded either by financial institutions, such as banks or insurance
companies, by corporations or by  individuals. Among the top ten Czech funds one can
identify three types of funds: domestic bank sponsored funds (five funds), foreign bank
sponsored funds (two funds), and non-bank funds (three funds) (see Table 3).
Table  3: Classification  of top ten voucher  investment  funds in the Czech  Republic
Fund  order  of  Sponsor  Ab-  Manage- Number  Investment
classification rank  in  brevi-  ment  of funds Privatization  Fund  2/
size  1/  ation  company
Domestic  1  Ceska  Sporitelna  CS  SIS  1  SPAS  3/
bank  (Czech  Savings
sponsored  Bank)
funds
2  Investicni  Banka  IB  PIAS  12  Rentiersky  Investment
(Czech  Fund  using  23.3%  of
Investment  Bank)  all points  acquired  by
PIAS
4  Komercni  Banka  KB  IKS  I  IPF  KB
5  Ceska  Pojistovna  CP  KIS  1  PIF
(Czech  Insurance
Company
9  Agrobanka  AB  A-Invest  9  A-invest
Foreign  bank  6  Creditanstalt  CA  Credit-  1  Creditanstalt  IPF
sponsored  anstalt
funds  Investment
.___  _  Company
7  Zivnostenska  ZB  ZB-Trust  1  Zivnostenska  1. Fund
Banka
Non-bank  3  ---  HCC  Harvard  8  Harvard  Dividend
funds  Capital  &  Fund  (which
Consulting  represents  49%  of
I__ _  I___  Harvard's  assets)
8  ---  PPF  PPF  4  Privni  Cesky  Fond
10  ---  YSE  YSE  I  IF YSE
1/ in  terms  of investment  points  acquired  in the  first  wave.
2/  for sponsors  that  founded  more  than  one  investment  fund  one  had  been  selected  for comparison
purposes.
3/ SPAS  was  directly  founded  by  its sponsor  Ceska  Sporitelna  and  not  by  a newly  founded
management  company  like  other  bank  sponsored  funds.
Source:  Fund  interviews.7
This classification stands even though one could argue that foreign bank sponsored funds
are private  since the foreign sponsor is private and could therefore be put  in one single
group of private funds together with non-bank funds. The difference between funds lies in
ownership and activity of the sponsor.
Ownership of management companies and sponsoring banks is important in fund analysis
since many banks were still state-owned when they founded their funds. Since most banks
have been included in the first privatization wave and the majority of their capital has been
privatized, the arguments relating to  indirect state ownership of  sponsors of  investment
funds will be of less importance over time. However, the activity of banks as sponsors
leads  to  a  close  association  of  investors  and  lenders  that  would  be  regarded  as  an
undesirable  conflict  of  interest  in  some  countries  (e.g.,  U.S.).  The  fumds are  using
employees from the sponsor to  select companies  in the bidding process and - at a later
stage - to  sit  on  boards  of the  companies  that  the  fund  owns.  The  sponsoring bank,
moreover, is getting information from the fund that might be useful to develop its lending
8 business . The funds sponsored by the principal Czech banks (see Table 3) each hold more
than 10% in a company's  capital in about half of their portfolio companies (see Table 11).
Zivnostenska  Banka9 and  Creditanstalt,  a  major  bank  from Austria,  are also  active  in
banking.
8However,  one fund in the category of domestic bank sponsored  funds does not entirely fit: the
overall activity of Ceska Pojistovna  is insurance  and not banking.  However,  Ceska Pojistovna  has
the same reciprocal relationship  with its management  company as many other bank sponsored
funds.
9The  majority of the capital of Zivnostenska Banka is in foreign hands (40% BHF Bank of
Germany  and 12% IFC). This is the reason why Zivnostenska  Banka is in the group of foreign
bank sponsored  funds. Nevertheless,  the bank is not a foreign bank like Creditanstalt  that came
from  another country and  started from  scratch a  subsidiary. Rather Zivnostenska was  a
Czechoslovak  bank that sold the majority of its capital to foreign partners and can therefore be
regarded  as a 'bank with major foreign  participation'.  Another aspect why Zivnostenska  Banka is
different from other Czech banks is the quality of its client portfolio:  the tasks of the bank under
the former Czechoslovak  banking system was to carry out the hard currency business for the
population.  Therefore,  the bank does not suffer from bad loans inherited  from the past like some
other financial institutions in the country. This might be one of the reasons why Zivnostenska8
Most management  companies founded  one single investment fund  whereas others  (like
Harvard and PIAS) founded several funds. The reasons for founding several funds are two-
fold: some management companies  wanted to offer  specialized funds by investing  in a
certain region or industry or funds meeting different preferences of investors, like funds
oriented  on  growth  and  others  on  high  dividends.  Second,  some  funds  wished  to
circumvent the upper 20% limit of ownership in a specific company, as this law applied in
the beginning only to the individual fund level. This law was later changed and applied at
the fund group level'0 so that fund groups owning more than 20% of a company in theory
had to sell part of their shares (but did not always in practice).
5.  Investment  strategy  of voucher funds
The choice of investment strategy relates to the desirable functions of a fund (Anderson,
1994): First, a  fund should provide the investor with  a diversified portfolio. Czech law
requires a minimum diversification of investment funds requiring that a fund has to invest
in at least ten companies. Second, a fund should try to select undervalued enterprises. In
"efficient" Western equity markets, underpriced shares are rare since share prices reflect all
public  information  on  potential  future  earnings  of  an  enterprise.  In  contrast,  in  a
privatization process there is much more potential to pick undervalued companies  since
information  is  scarce  and  costly.  IPFs  were  expected  to  have  better  management
capabilities and more insights in enterprises and thus have a higher probability of choosing
undervalued enterprises than individuals. All this goes to show that investment funds make
emerging  markets  more  efficient.  Third,  funds are  expected to  exert  governance  over
companies they hold in their portfolio. The degree of governance mainly depends on the
share that a fund holds in a specific company. On the lower end, (dispersed ownership),
there is the US-type mutual fund that is limited by government regulations and tax laws to
Banka is the only Czech Bank that was 100%  privatized  after the first wave (the remaining  48% of
the capital were distributed via vouchers) whereas the Fund of National Property still owns a
minority  stake in most other  Czech banks.
10  A fund group consists  of all investment  funds  managed  by a single  management  company.9
owning no more than a few percent in a given enterprise. On the upper end, (concentrated
ownership), there are venture capital or so-called turn-around funds which are often major
owners  in portfolio  enterprises and often provide capital and  management  resources to
restructure an enterprise. In the Czech and Slovak Republics, funds may own up to 20% in
a given enterprise, and thus they lie in the middle of the above-mentioned extremes.
Table 4:  Supply (shares) and demand (voucher points) in  the  first wave of
privatization
Bidding  Round  %
1  2  3  4  5  TOTAL  available matched
voucher  points  used  (billion)  2.98  3.41  1.02  0.51  0.52  8.44  8.56  98.6
Number  of shares  sold  (million)  89.4  77.8  32.5  37.1  40.9  277.7  299.4  92.8
average  number  of  points  per share  33.3  43.8  31.4  13.7  12.7  30.4  28.6  -
share  transfer  per 1,000  points  30.0  22.8  31.9  72.7  78.7  32.4  35.0
Source:  Mejstrik  et al. (1994).
How did the funds select their portfolios? Two strategies are possible. First, a fund, like
any other investor, could use its points for more expensive shares (more points per share)
or cheaper shares (fewer points per share). Over the five bidding rounds, the difference
between the most  expensive and the cheapest share was 600:1".  Second, a  fund could
invest in a dispersed portfolio with many enterprises or in a concentrated portfolio with
only a few enterprises. Since every fund has a limited number of points, the two aspects are
related.
In order to evaluate whether funds invested in cheaper or more expensive shares, one can
compare the book value of shares acquired per voucher book invested. The book value of
each share was  set at CSKI,000,  and  one voucher book consisted of  1,000 investment
points that each citizen over 18 years of age was eligible to purchase for CSKI,035  ($35
which amounts to 25% of an average monthly income at that time). The higher the average
I  IFor a more  detailed  analysis  of the investment  procedure  over the five bidding  rounds  see Shafik
(1993  and 1994).10
share price (expressed in points per share) of a fund's portfolio of shares acquired in the
12 voucher auction, the lower the book value of those shares  . If one takes the total  book
value  of shares privatized  in the  first wave,  the average book  value per  voucher book
invested amounts to CSK32,400.  In the case of IPFs, the average book value was only
CSK29,000.  This  indicates  that  funds  typically  invested  in  more  expensive  shares
compared to individuals (see Table 5).
Table 5: Investment  mode
Voucher  points  Number  of shares  Average  book  value
invested  acquired  per voucher  book
by  million  in %  CSK  in %  CSK
million
IPFs  6,112  71.4  176.0  63.4  29,000
Individuals  2,454  28.6  101.7  36.6  41,400
TOTAL  8,566  100.0  277.7  100.0  32,400
Source:  Mejstrik  et al. (1994)  and  author's  calc lations.
Investments by individual investors had two features (see Table 22 in the appendix). First,
they were neutral to enterprise size as far as their potential influence in the enterprise was
concerned,  since as individuals they were too  small to  exert any influence over even a
small company. Second, individual investors  seemed to prefer large (and therefore well
known) enterprises  3. This is very much in contrast to funds, especially small investment
funds that preferred to invest in small companies (71% of the companies in which small
funds invested were small companies). It should be mentioned that share prices for smaller
companies were on average considerably higher'4 than share prices for bigger companies.
12 In the Czech and Slovak  Republics,  it is customary  to divide the total book value of the fund's
shares  by the number  of voucher  books  transferred  to the fund to derive a "book value per voucher
book". A similar calculation  can be made for all the shares bought by individuals  who did not
transfer  their vouchers  to a fund.
13 Individual  investors  spent 57% of their voucher  points to bid for large  enterprises.
14 The  average price is defined  here as the unweighted  mean of share prices  of all companies.I1
In addition,  as a group, small  funds invested only  in half the number of companies  as
medium and large funds. This was their only chance to exert influence over the companies
in their portfolio, given the  limited number of  points the  small funds acquired.  Of the
companies  held  by  small  funds,  98%  were  small  and  medium,  whereas  large  funds
diversified their investments relatively evenly among all sizes of enterprises. In short, small
investment funds, due to limited number of points and the investment strategy chosen, have
a much greater ability to act as turn-around funds with stronger governance incentives. In
contrast, larger funds - due to the number of points acquired and the maximum level of
20% per  company - emerged with  relatively  less concentrated  portfolios with  reduced
governance incentives. The analysis will discuss below to what extent the 20% limit of
ownership in a single company was a binding condition for the top ten funds.
Table  6: Rank  of IPFs  by book  value per voucher  book
Investment  strategy  Low-price-shares  =  =  High-price-shares  =  =
IPF 1/  YSE  PPF  AB  KB  HCC  CP  CS  CA  IB  ZB
Book  value  [CSK1,000]  2/  48.5  41.8  33.6  25.6  23.8  22.7  22.5  21.8  18.5  16.0
Rank  by fund  size 3/  10  8  9  4  3  5  1  6  2  7
Fund  category  4/  NB  NB  DB  DB  NBB  DB  DB  FB  DB  FB
1/ Names of funds by fund  group  (for  bank sponsored  funds  categorization  by sponsor):
YSE=YSE;  PPF=PPF;  AB=Agrobanka;  KB=Komercni  Banka;  HCC=Harvard  Capital  &  Consulting;
CP=Ceska  Pojistovna;  CS=Ceska  Sporitelna;  CA=Creditanstalt;  IB=lnvesticni  Banka;
ZB=Zivnostenska  Banka.
2/ per voucher  book  invested  (average book  value  of privatized  property  per voucher  book:
CSK32,400).
3/ in terms of investment  points  acquired  in the first  wave.
4/ NB=non-bank;  DB=domestic  bank sponsored; FB=foreign  bank sponsored.
Source:  Fund interviews.
Looking at our set of the top ten Czech funds one can see they behaved very distinctively
with  respect  to  the  outlined  high-price  vs.  low-price  investment  strategy.  YSE  fund
acquired an average book value of shares three times as high as Zivnostenska Banka's,  in
other words, Zivnostenska Banka's  fund spent three times as many points per share in the
portfolio (see Table 6). Seven funds opted (on average) for high-price shares (low book
value per voucher book) whereas only three funds tried to focus on low-price shares (high12
book value per voucher book). It should be noted that it is the relatively smaller and non-
bank funds (YSE and PPF) that are at the upper end in our set in opting for cheaper shares.
These funds mainly invested their points in bidding rounds four and five where the average
number  of  points  for  one  share  was  considerably  lower  than  in  the  previous  rounds
(compare Table 4). This investment strategy was risky since the funds ran the risk of being
left with unused points. Most of the other funds invested in the first bidding rounds in order
to place all the points and to  get a stake in their preferred companies. This may be the
reason why the average number of points invested for the purchase of one share was higher
in the first three rounds, and especially in round two.
The two foreign bank sponsored funds chose a strategy opposite that of YSE and PPF,
namely to  invest in the most expensive enterprises. Consequently, Zivnostenska Banka's
fund has the lowest book value per voucher book. Taking into consideration that the two
foreign bank sponsored funds also have private ownership patterns like YSE and PPF, and
are also among the smaller funds in the analyzed set of funds, it can be argued that among
the  top  ten  funds  neither  size  nor  ownership  pattern  of  the  fund  correlates  with  the
investment strategy concerning cheap or expensive shares.
Choosing cheap and undervalued shares (shares with a high turn around potential) required
more detailed informnation  on companies than publicly available. It is thus not  swuprising
that foreign bank sponsored funds faced considerable difficulties in opting for this strategy
since they did not have enough insights into the economy of the country. Therefore, foreign
bank sponsored funds generally invested in well-known and attractive companies with high
export potential and strategic owners. Foreign bank sponsored funds consequently  spent
more points per share than other funds.
Foreign  bank  sponsored  funds also  preferred  to  invest  in  industries that  required  less
research and  screening of  individual company  information. Suitable enterprises  can be
identified in non-cyclical industries such as food, and in sectors that were expected to grow
early,  such  as  construction.  Table  7  shows  three  different  types  of  industries:  First,13
relatively  attractive  industries  like  food  and  construction,  second,  monopolistic  and
oligopolistic industries like the financial sector and energy, and third, difficult industries
like machinery, engineering, and  heavy industry  which require more  screening of firm
specific information). While many funds carried out extensive interviews with companies
some  foreign  bank  sponsored  funds  expressed  misgivings  about  this  approach  since
accounting standards were still poor.
Funds are also very distinctive with regard to investments in financial institutions. While it
was prohibited for an investment fund established by a bank to invest in bank shares, there
are different interpretations of whether that also applied to funds which were founded by
management companies that were subsidiaries of the banks'5. Technically, banks did not
themselves  establish  the  fund  since  funds  are  only  their  grandchildren.  Thus,  many
domestic  bank  sponsored  funds  invested  in  bank  shares  and  even  in  shares  of  their
management company's banking parent. As a consequence, investments of domestic bank
sponsored  funds  in  financial  institutions  led  to  considerable  cross-ownership  among
16 banks
It is interesting that foreign bank sponsored funds were more cautious with regard to the
interpretation of the law, and avoided investing in financial institutions. Non-bank  funds
and  domestic  bank  sponsored  funds, however,  considered  investments  in  the  financial
sector to be attractive. Harvard Capital & Consulting (HCC), a non-bank fund, stated that it
favored investments  in companies that had a predominant position in the market due to
their role in the former command economy. The financial sector can be regarded as an
15See  Law No. 248/1992, Section 24 (11). An English translation can be found in: Financial
Services  Legislation  (provided  by Trade Links, 1994).
16 See Mejstrik  (1994. 14-17).  Some bank funds  even bought  considerable  stakes in the sponsoring
bank. An extreme  example  are the funds of Investicni Banka  which hold 17%  of the shares of the
banking  parent.  See also section  on 'the relationship  between  banks and investment  funds' below.14
1  7 oligopolistic market  .Another monopolistic sector, preferred by domestic funds is energy.
HCC invested more than 70% of its voucher points in these two sectors.
Table  7: Fund's  investment  in different  industries
Fund  category  foreign
domestic  bank  sponsored  bank spons.  l  non-bank  funds
Fund group  CS  IB_J KB_CP_[  AB  CA]  ZB  HCC  PPF  YSE
Food/consumer  goods  26  16  9  23  n/a  30  40  8  30  2
Construction  1/  14  0  8  2  n/a  30  17  3  15  5
Financial  institutions  15  50  22  14  n/a  0  0  50  0  43
Energy  19  10  19  7  n/a  0  0  23  5  10
Machinery/engineering  12  9  11  21  n/a  16  7  1  0  35  6
1/ including  construction  materials.
Remark:  for fund names  and  fund classification  see  Table  3. Bold  figures  represent  significant
investments.
Source:  Fund  interviews.
Since domestic  banks  had  more  information on  individual  companies  than  most other
market  participants,  funds  of  this  type  also  invested  in  more 'difficult'  industries  like
machinery, engineering and heavy industiy (between 9 and 21% of their voucher points).
Surprisingly, the non-bank fund PPF courageously invested considerably in this industry.
Table  8: Diversification of fund's portfolio (June 30, 1994)
I__________  HCCZBCAYSEPPF  ABCP  KBCS
Numberof  companies  46  50  72  126  186  215  241|  320  245  476
Asset  value  of top  ten
companies  1/  77  60  63  70  54  25  42  44  49  28
Fund  category  2/  NB  FB  FB  NB  NB  DB  DB  DB  DB  DB
1/ in % of asset  value  of total portfolio  (at market  prices).
2/ NB=non-bank;  DB=domestic  bank  sponsored;  FB=foreign  bank  sponsored.
Remark:  for fund names  see Table  3.
Source:  Fund  interviews.
17Ceska  Sporitelna,  the Czech Savings  Bank, holds 40% of the savings in the country and the big
commercial  banks, Komercni  Banka  and Investicni  Banka,  hold significant  portfolios  of enterprise
credit.15
One of the objectives of an investment fund is to provide a diversified portfolio. There is a
wide range of interpretation as to what 'diversified' really means. At the end of 1992, the
number of portfolio companies in the set of top ten funds ranged from 51 (Harvard) to 514
(Ceska  Sporitelna). Table  8  shows portfolio  diversification in  mid-1994 with  domestic
bank sponsored funds tending to have more diversified portfolios than the other two fund
types.  Apart from the  number of companies  in the portfolio  there is another  important
variable that characterizes the diversification of risk in a portfolio, namely the degree of
concentration.  Looking  at the  net asset  value'8 of  the  top  ten  portfolio  companies  in
relation to the total asset value of a portfolio, one can see that foreign bank sponsored and
non-bank  funds allocated  a  greater  share of  their  investments on  the top  ten  portfolio
companies (between 54 and 77%) than domestic bank sponsored funds, which tended to
spread investments more evenly among the portfolio companies. Table 8 shows that among
domestic bank sponsored funds the top ten companies only account for between 25 and
49% of the asset value of the portfolio'9.
6.  Fund performance
The  general  public  thought  investment  funds  to  be  better  able  to  choose  attractive
companies in the bidding rounds than individuals, and that this was one of the reasons for
the  success  of  IPFs  in  voucher  privatization. Did  funds  really  perform  better  in  that
respect? One would want to compare the net asset value per voucher book of an average
investment fund with  the net asset value of an  investment carried out  by an  individual
citizen. However, such  an  analysis is  impossible at  this  time.  On average,  individuals
invested in the cheaper shares (compare Table 5), which could be expected to be, at least to
a certain degree, shares of low liquidity. This point is important since the shares of about
one-third of the companies involved in the voucher process have not yet been traded. Thus,
18While  the book value represents  an 'accounting  value', the net asset value is based on market
prices.
19 See also chapter  on "the  relationship  between  banks  and funds"  below.16
it is difficult to determine  'market  prices'  for such shares. Taken by itself, the net asset
value of an average individual investment portfolio could be very misleading. Although it
might be difficult to form an 'average individual portfolio' at the current moment or in the
20 future  , a comparison between find  and individual performance could be attempted at a
later time when more market liquidity is attained.
How did the top ten funds perform since the beginning of their activity in 1992 until June
30,  1994? In general, the non-bank - and to a lesser extent the foreign bank sponsored -
funds outperformed the domestic bank sponsored funds. The net asset value of the portfolio
(at market prices, per voucher book invested) of the most successful fund is more than
twice that of the least successful  fund in this survey. In other words, shares owned by
domestic bank sponsored funds are relatively cheaper than shares of funds that belong to
the other two fund categories. In the group of domestic bank sponsored funds, the funds of
Investicni Banka seem to have attained the best result, perhaps largely due to the fact that
21 this fund invested strongly in the financial sector and energy (compare Table 7)  . After
trading started on the stock exchange  share prices of banks and energy companies  have
increased faster than the market average.
Table 9: Rank of funds by net asset value per voucher book on June 30, 1994 (in
CZK)
YSE  |  HCC |  IB  PPF  ZB  CA  KB  |  CS  |  AB  |  CP
47,620  1 37,000  1 34,770  1 33,080  28,950  28,460  26,640  23,680  21,330  20,760
Remark:  for fund  names  and  fund  classification  see  Table  3.
|Source.  Fund  interviews.
20 From a global data source, share ownership  of individuals  is only known  after the five bidding
rounds. Since then, many individuals  sold their shares on the stock exchange (either to funds,
strategic investors  or other individuals).  For a more precise assessment  of individual  ownership
today,  the ownership  structure  of all participating  enterprises  would  have to be analyzed.
'II
2  There is some doubt on the prices used to calculate  the net asset value of this fund in particular,
but also of funds in general because the shares of many companies have never been traded or
trading took place only rarely or in fairly low volume.  Some funds evaluate shares that have not
been  traded by their book value,  which is misleading  since  the 'real' price would be far below.17
7.  Discount to net asset value
One of the most surprising aspects in the analysis of voucher fund shares 22 has been the
strong discount of  the fund share  price in  relation to  the net asset value  of the  fund's
portfolio per share. Table 10 shows that the discount to net asset value amounts to between
20-80%,  which  is  far  larger  than  Western or  emerging  market  closed-end  funds.  One
explanation for the discounts is the low liquidity of the market reflecting the difficulty of a
fund in actually liquidating its portfolio. Taking the discount of fund shares into account,
the IPFs offering the greatest market value per voucher book invested, are Creditanstalt and
YSE.  The  funds  with  the  lowest  discounts  are  the  foreign  bank  sponsored  funds
(Creditanstalt and Zivnostenska Banka), which might reflect confidence of the market in
the management capability of this fund category. A lower discount could be a sign that the
market  perceives  this  fund  to  be  a  better  monitor  of  enterprises.  What  is  surprising,
however, is, that most non-bank funds (like PPF and Harvard) have the strongest discounts.
Confidence of the market in the fund therefore seems not to be the only explanation for a
higher or lower discount. Other aspects seem to have played a role.
One factor explaining higher or lower discounts may be that IPFs promised to buy back
fund shares from their investors for a certain price after one year. It can be seen that the
funds with  the  highest discounts  are the  funds that  made  promises  to  their  investors,
whereas  funds  that  made  no  promises  have  lower  discounts  (see  Table  10).  This
observation could be explained as follows: the promises were between 10 to 15 times the
amount each citizen had to pay for a voucher book (CSKI,000).  If one looks at the overall
book value of shares privatized in the first wave, every citizen participating in the process
received on average 32 shares (with a book value of CSK32,000). This is an indication why
the promise of Harvard fund to buy back a voucher book for ten times its initial price of
CSK1,000  was perhaps  not  as  extraordinary as  it first  sounded,  although  it was quite
22 Fund shares  are the shares issued  by the fund (and owned  by the former  voucher  holders), while
shares of portfolio  companies  are the shares  owned  by the fund.18
uncertain at the time how the price of an average share with a book value of CSK1.000
would develop.
Table 10: Rank  of funds  by discounts  of fund shares  (as of June 30, 1994)
PPF  HCC  IB  CP  AB  YSE  CS  KB  ZB  CA
Discount  1/  78  72  72  62  58  56  53  51  37  28
Market  value  2/  7.3  10.4  9.6  8.0  9.0  21.0  11.0  13.3  18.0  21.0
buy  back  promise  3/  11.0  10.3  11.0  15.0  n/a  - 12.0  - - -
1/ Discount  of fund  share  in relation  to net  asset  value  per  fund share
2/ Market  value  of investment  [in 1,000  CZK]  (= fund share  price  x number  of fund  shares per
voucher  book)
3/ Promise  to buy back  fund  shares  [in 1,000  CZK]  (per  voucher  book).  "-" means  that  fund  gave
no buy back  promise.
Remark:  for fund  names  and  fund  classification  see Table  3. Source:  Fund interviews.
How did Czech share prices develop after privatization? The total market capitalization in
the Czech Republic in June 30, 1994 was estimated at $12.3 billion (Creditanstalt, 1994). It
should be noted that around one-third of the companies involved in the first wave have not
been traded even once and another third is rarely traded. Therefore it is difficult to say what
'market capitalization' really  means. If one assumes that the above-stated figure mainly
reflects the value of the two-thirds of regularly and occasionally traded shares, which is
then divided over the number of outstanding shares (which includes rarely and non-traded
23 shares), the average value of a Czech share is still far above the book value of CSK1,000
Thus,  the  average  market  value  of  a  voucher  book  is  far  greater  than  the  buy  back
guarantees of some funds. This might explain why the promise of voucher funds in that
price range may have created an upper ceiling for the price of a fund share. There are two
interpretations for this upper ceiling. First, market participants might consider the 'price'
that was indicated by a fund itself as the 'real market price', i. e. the perception of what the
price should be. A second interpretation might be that funds buying back their fund shares
and selling them again on the secondary market create some kind of excess supply of their
own shares. Since many fund shares are quoted at high discounts, buying back fund shares
23 The average  value of a share at this point  of time can be estimated  at around CZK1,700.19
from voucher investors might be a profitable business for a  fund in the medium24 term
since a fund (or its sponsor) is buying a share with an underlying net asset value two to
four times higher. This explains why funds (or sponsors) that provide cash for their fund
shares would rather hold them under the current situation than sell them on the secondary
market.  Therefore  the  first  interpretation  of  an  upper  ceiling  seems  to  offer  the  most
convincing  explanation:  the  buy  back guarantee  was perceived  'the  fair market  price'
which resulted in high discounts to net asset value for shares of funds making promises to
their investors.
The biggest divergence between the market value of an invested voucher book and the buy
back promise of the sponsor is for the fund established by Ceska Pojistovna, the Czech
Insurance Company. The fund's share is quoted at only half the price at the stock exchange
in comparison to  the guaranteed buy  back price. This  was the  reason why half  of the
investors in Ceska Pojistovna's fund have used their option to redeem their fund shares for
cash, far more than investors of other funds.
8.  Funds and corporate governance
Spending many points on one single enterprise does not necessarily mean that a fund has
got a high stake in a given enterprise. It could also mean that the fund invested in the big
companies  (that issued more shares than small companies). In  order to  assess a  fund's
ability to control portfolio enterprises, one would have to analyze the number of companies
in the portfolio, in which the fund owns a significant or controlling stake. In this study, a
significant stake is defined as more than 10% of outstanding share, which is the proportion
funds are generally given a  seat on the governing boards of the company. Many funds,
24 The validity  of this statement  is of course dependent  on a higher liquidity  of the stock market for
the fund being  able to liquidate  its portfolio.20
however, were able to  get a seat on the board with an ownership share below  1  0%25. A
26 controlling stake is defined here as above 18% (and up to 20%) of a company's capital
Table II:  Rank of IPFs by number of companies  with > 10% in capital (in % of total
number of companies  in portfolio) at December 31, 1992 (June 30, 1994)
HCC  IB  I  CS  I  YSE  I  PPF  I  KB  I  CA  CP  ZB  AB
86 (84)  67 (51) | 53 (47) T  42 (n/a) I n/a (34) | 33 (n/a) l 31 (32)  30 (37)  20 (20)  17 (20)
Remark: for fund names and fund classification see Table 3.
Source: Fund interviews.
Table 12: Rank of IPFs by number of companies  with > 18% in capital (in % of total
number of companies  in portfolio) at December 31, 1992 (June 30, 1994)
HCC  IB  |  PPF  |  YSE  CS  |  CA  KB  CP  AB  |  ZB
. 65(56)  32(25)  n/a(14)  11 (n/a)  9(11)  8(8)  7(n/a)  5(5)  4(5)  0  (0)
Remark: for fund names and fund classification see  Table 3.
Source: Fund interviews.
Table 1  I and Table  12 show a great diversity in funds' portfolio concentration. Harvard's
portfolio is by far the most concentrated, since the fund owns a significant stake in 86% of
its companies and a controlling stake in 65% of its companies. What is surprising is the
fund sponsored by Ceska Sporitelna, the Czech Savings bank, which is by far the biggest
fund  in the  first wave.  This  fund  is often blamed  for  having invested in  a  diversified
portfolio with over 500 companies and being unable to exert any influence over them. On
the one  hand,  the criticism  is justified  to  the  extent  that Ceska  Sporitelna could  have
achieved portfolio diversification by investing in only half the number of enterprises. On
the other hand - due to the upper limit of 20% per enterprise - Sporitelna was forced to
diversify in a large number of enterprises since it received so many points. Still, Sporitelna
is not performing so badly with respect to its potential influence on portfolio enterprises
25 See chapter on 'the relationship  between  banks and investment  funds'  below.
26 The level of 18%  (instead of 20%) had been chosen since - due to the process of the bidding
rounds - funds (even bidding for 20%) received in the end stakes that were slightly below this
number.21
since it owns a significant stake in more than half of its companies and a controlling stake
in 9% of its companies. This situates Sporitelna ahead of the two foreign bank sponsored
funds - Creditanstalt and Zivnostenska Banka. In fact, Zivnostenska Banka does not have a
controlling stake in a single company. In general, however, in the set of top ten funds, the
non-bank  funds  opted  most  often  for  concentrated  portfolios,  a  precondition  for  any
corporate governance action.
For the most  part, IPFs have kept the portfolio  they acquired through the five bidding
rounds with no major changes in the portfolio, at least in the funds analyzed here 27. In the
fund interviews most of them reported that the predominant activity between end- 1992 and
mid-1994 can be seen as portfolio clearing. This means that most funds sold shareholdings
of enterprises in which they held only a small stake, because there was a strategic investor
or  because the  share price  seemed to  be  'unusually  high'.  Table  13 analyzes  portfolio
clearing by looking at the decrease or increase in number of companies in the portfolios.
Most funds across all three fund categories tried to focus their activity on a smaller number
of companies by decreasing the number of portfolio  companies. Again, some  non-bank
funds (Harvard and PPF) and the foreign bank sponsored fund from Creditanstalt showed
the greatest interest in further reducing the number of companies in the portfolio.
Table 13: Rank of IPFs by change in number of companies  in portfolio between
December  31, 1992  and June 30, 1994  (in %)
|  CA  AB  KB  PPF  CP  CS  YSE  HCC  ZB  lB
-23  -16  -8  -8  -8  -7  -5  -2  9  20
Remark:  for fund  names and fund  classification  see Table 3.
Source:  Fund interviews.
Since owners can be represented in companies in which they own less than 10%  of a firm's
capital, a more precise indicator of the relationship between owners and company would be
the number of companies in which the fund is represented on the board in relation to the
27 One of the reasons  for this is the low liquidity  of the market;  see Jaros and Sanders  (1994,  9).22
number of companies the fund holds (which is shown in Table  14). However, this figure
does not reflect the quality of board representation, i.e. the number of seats or the number
of votes on the board. The most important result shown in Table 14 is that funds in all three
fund categories are represented in at least half of their portfolio enterprises. This underlines
the basic difference between voucher funds in the Czech Republic and U.S. type pension
funds  or  French  investment  funds  (SICAV),  which  are  generally  not  represented  on
governing boards of portfolio companies. Thus, investment finds  in the Czech Republic
can act as corporate monitors by screening non-public information.
Table  14: Rank  of IPFs by number  of representations  (in % of number  of companies
in portfolio)
CA  HCC  ZB  YSE  CP  PPF  CS  KB  IB  AB
83  80  72  67  66  65  59  53  50  n/a
FB  NB  FB  NB  DB  NB  DB  DB  DB  DB
Fund  categories:  DB=domestic  bank  sponsored;  FB=foreign  bank  sponsored;  NB=non-bank.
Remark:  for fund names  see Table  3.
Source:  Fund  interviews.
Despite  this  general  rule,  however,  Czech  funds  differ  considerably  regarding  their
governance role. One can see that the non-bank and foreign bank sponsored funds seek as
many representations  as possible  whereas  some  of the domestic  bank  sponsored funds
showed a relatively less strong desire. One fund showing an unusually strong desire to be
represented on company boards is the IPF  from Zivnostenska Banka. Although the fund
owns 10% or more of a firm's  capital in only 20% of its companies, the fund is represented
on the boards of 72% of the companies it owns.
Most Czech corporations are legally set up following the German-type dual board system
consisting of separate management and supervisory boards. In a dual board system owners
are represented on the supervisory board and are charged with appointing management and
deciding on major changes in the corporation. The management board meets more often to
carry  out  day-to-day  decisions.  However,  there  is  a  general  reluctance  in  the  Czech23
Republic to follow this rule. Since management boards meet more often, major owners try
to  get better  and  more frequent  information by  being  represented on  the  management
board. The top ten funds preferred to sit on the management board in between 50 and 90%
of all board representations (see Table 15), showing that funds try to play an active role in
enterprise management and corporate control.
Table 15: Rank  of IPFs by number  of representations  on management  boards  (in %
of all representations  in companies)
L  HCC  CS  ZB  IB  CP  PPF  KB  CA  YSE  AB
90  82  80  77  74  73  66  60  50  50
Remark:  for fund names  and fund  classification  see Table  3.
One  of the  most  important rights  of any  major  shareholder is the  right to  replace the
management  if it seems to  be necessary.  Since the predominant goal of a  privatization
process  is  to  change  the  governance  structure  of  firms,  changing  the  incumbent
management may be considered a sign of proactive behavior on the part of shareholders.
Nevertheless, the data shown in Table 16 on this issue should be taken with some caution
since  there  is  not  a  consistent  understanding  of what  "change of  management"  really
means: did the entire board or only some managers have to leave? Were managers replaced
because  the owners fired them or was  it due to  natural  fluctuation?  Many funds were
reluctant to  answer this  question. The reason might be that  some funds do not  want to
become associated with 'unsocial behavior'. In any case, a single fund could not take the
decision to replace the management on its own. Even some domestic bank sponsored funds
have taken action to replace management even though they are blamed for being affiliated
with banks that are still partly state-owned. Non-bank funds, like YSE, however, seem to
be more proactive in firing the incumbent management.
Another concern in the study was the affiliation of the fund management company's  staff
serving as directors on boards of the fund's portfolio companies. In most cases the decision
to appoint directors is taken on the level of the management company. However, not all24
directors are directly employed by the management company, and in fact most of the bank
sponsored funds rely on employees from the mother bank (see Table  17). The use of bank
staff  gives  an  indication  of  the  close  relationship  between  both  banks  and  their
management company and between banks and enterprises.
Table 16: Rank of IPFs by  percentage  of companies in portfolio in which the
management  has been  changed
|  YSE  CP  CA  KB  AB  PPF  ZB  HCC  CS  IB
70(partly)  10  5  4  4  3  2  n/a  n/a  n/a  |
Remark:  for fund  names  and  fund  classification  see Table  3.
Source:  Fund  interviews.
Table  17:  Affiliation  of staff  to serve  as director  for board  representation  (number  of
people)
Fund  type  domestic  bank  sponsored  foreign  bank  non-bank  funds
sponsored
Fund  name  CS  IB  KB  CP I  AB  CA  ZB  HCC  PPF  YSE
Management  85  20  23  20  32  9  7  20  16  15
company
Banking  parent  0  45  4  69  54  1  16  0  0  0
External  consultants  10  0  41  18  50  5  0  1  80  50
TOTAL  95  65  68  107  136  15  23  21  96  65
Remark:  for fund  names  and  fund  classification  see Table  3.
Source:  Fund  interviews.
While bank staff serving as directors on boards of portfolio companies can be regarded as a
"formal"  indication  of  the  close  relationship  between  the  sponsoring  bank  and  its
management  company,  this  relationship  is  also  characterized  by  "informal"  links.  In
interviews, many management companies owned by banks reported that joint screening of
enterprise  information  was  rather  frequent  during  the  voucher  bidding  process.  One
exception in the group of domestic bank sponsored funds - at least as far as the "formal"
relationship is concerned - is SIS, the management company of Ceska  Sporitelna (CS).25
This  management company relies mainly  on its own staff, as the only  one in that fund
category using no employees from the mother bank 28
In the group of foreign bank sponsored funds one can observe different policies: Whereas
ZB-Trust, the management company of Zivnostenska Banka. heavily relies on employees
from the sponsoring bank to serve as directors. this approach seems to be the exception for
Creditanstalt.  The difference in the relationship between the bank  and the  management
company of the two foreign bank sponsored funds can also be observed in their different
portfolio selection approach. For the reasons mentioned above, Creditanstalt did not carry
out company interviews to select enterprises. ZB-Trust, however, reported extensive talks
with enterprises they considered for potential investment. Since Zivnostenska Banka is a
former Czech bank with a strategic Western investor, this behavior might reflect the desire
to build on the local market knowledge by integrating bank staff in the portfolio selection
and the enterprise monitoring process.
9.  The relationship between banks and investment funds
The relationship between funds and banks is one of the most  salient features of Czech
privatization, and  is  important in  assessing the role of  banks  in corporate  governance.
Seven  out of the ten analyzed funds are affiliated  to banks (both  domestic and  foreign
banks). These seven bank affiliated funds have acquired 47% of all vouchers transferred to
funds (compare Table 2). The ten biggest financial institutions  in the Czech and  Slovak
Republics account for about 43%  of all voucher points  and 60% of the voucher points
acquired by all investment funds, illustrating that banks play an important role in Czech
voucher privatization. Although these seven funds are, as all other funds, owned by many
former voucher holders, these funds are defined as 'bank affiliated'  since the management
company of these funds is a direct subsidiary of a bank. The relationship between banks
and investment funds leads to a combination of debt and equity finance since banks could
28 See next chapter on "the relationship  between  banks and investment  funds".26
provide loans to  enterprises which  are part of the portfolio of the affiliated  investment
funds.
Investment funds were often criticized of being weak owners since they lack the ability to
provide additional  financing.  However,  this  is  only  one  perspective  on  the  issue.  To
withhold financing might be even more important in a case where external owners do not
agree with  the plans of management. In such a case, where a bank sponsored fund was
convinced that a portfolio company required additional finance, the fund's  management
company could still overcome informational asymmetries in capital markets by asking the
banking  parent  to  provide  the  resources  since  the  fund's  management  company,  if
represented on  the board  of  the  portfolio company,  has  got  better  information on  the
company than any other external owner.
This relationship between funds as owners and its sponsors (in the form of banks providing
finance) is often seen as a conflict of interest: Some analysts argue that the predominant
interest of banks is not to found investment companies that restructure the enterprises, but
to gain access to lending opportunities 29. This view assumes that banks are unable to find
enterprises to which they could provide finance even though they have a desire to do so.
This perception of financial markets in Central Europe is rather misleading, because in the
countries in transition, the contrary seems to be the case due to  a general reluctance of
banks to provide finance 30 to the enterprise sector. Due to distorted incentives under former
29 A possible  conflict  of interest  results from the fact that banks could  receive  information  from the
management  company  to be used for loan negotiations  with a company  the fund holds. For the
management  company,  maximization  of the fund's value is not necessarily  the predominant  goal.
If one takes the profit of a portfolio  company  as given,  the directors could try to impose  a higher
interest  rate on a loan  given by the sponsoring  bank. This means that a bank could  take advantage
for  lending opportunities by  being represented on  boards via their  affiliated management
companies at the expense of the fund's value. Whether this represents a conflict of interest in
reality is unclear, and relates to the continual  discussion  of German  type versus Anglo-American
monitoring  systems of firms. Funds are actually not bank owned but somehow bank affiliated.
This is the reason why the situation of IPFs does not entirely fit in one or the other monitoring
mechanisms  mentioned  above. For an analysis  on this issue see also Dittus and Prowse  (1994); on
conflicts  of interest  see especially  p. 9.
30 see, for example,  Drabek  (1993, 26).27
central planning, the overall economic environment is rather uncertain and in permanent
flux,  and the external evaluation of enterprise restructuring plans  is difficult and costly.
Therefore many potential bank loans face a relatively high risk-return ratio 31. If banks fully
included the transaction costs, which result from extensive information screening, interest
rates and  therefore  financial  cost  would  become  too  high.  In this  environment  many
externally financed investment projects might become unprofitable and restructuring would
not take place to a sufficient degree.
Another  concern  has  been  the  considerable  cross-ownership  among  banks  and  their
affiliated investment funds 32 in the Czech and Slovak Republics. Many of the banks were
partly privatized in the first wave of privatization with remaining shares still held by the
state.  Domestic  bank  sponsored  funds often  hold  minority  stakes  in  other  banks  and
sometimes even stakes in its management company's mother bank (see Table 18). There is
a  high  degree of  concentration in  banking in transitional  economies  leading to  limited
competition among banks. Thus. cross ownership among banks limits banking competition
33 even more and should therefore be of concern for policy makers
Table 18: Cross ownership in  the  banking sector in  the  Czech and Slovak
Republics
CS  IB  KB  CP  VUB  SIB 1/  SP 2/
Share  privatized  through  vouchers  37  52  53  65  52  52  48
Share  held  by domestic  bank sponsored  funds  16  32  26  7  35  23  20
Share  held  by the affiliated  fund  0  17  3  1  11  19  5
1/ Slovak  lnvesticni  Banka  (Slovak  Investment  Bank).
2/ Slovak  Pojistovna  (Slovak  Insurance  Company).
Note:  For other bank  names  see  Table  3. Source:  Mejstrik  (1994).
The role of financial intermediaries as corporate monitors is also influenced at a macro
level. In other Central and  Eastern European countries with high  budget deficits  banks
31 For a more  detailed  discussion  of this issue  see Dittus (1994).
32 On cross ownership  in Czech privatization  see also Coffee  (1994,  22).
33 See footnote 15 and adjoining  text.28
prefer to buy government bonds instead of giving loans to the enterprise sector ("crowding
out").  In such an  environment, low information costs about the profitability of a  firm's
investment  plans  are even  more  important.  The  decrease  of  information  asymmetries
between insiders of the enterprise and outsiders in the form of banks are key in providing
additional external finance to enterprises to enable restructuring 34. Corporate governance
cannot only be exerted by shareholders, but also through debt instruments, for example, in
form of additional bank loans or a reduction of lending 35. However, in the Czech case, the
equity control mechanism - namely funds' monitoring on enterprise boards - would enable
additional debt finance. The distinction between equity and debt control is less important
than the underlying control mechanism of finance  36. The bottom line is that the observed
close relationship between  a  domestic bank  sponsored  fund  and  its  affiliated  banking
parent  can be  regarded  as an  additional  step  to  overcome  information  asymmetries  in
premature capital markets and towards stronger governance of firms37.
In what way did banks try to get involved in corporate decision making? As mentioned
above, domestic  bank sponsored funds invested in a much larger number of enterprises
than foreign bank  sponsored and  non-bank  funds. In the interviews, some management
companies of domestic bank sponsored funds indicated, that they intended to  invest in a
much smaller number of companies  but the sponsoring bank influenced the decision to
develop a more diversified portfolio. Table 19 shows that domestic bank sponsored funds
tried  to  get as many representations on the boards  of portfolio companies  as  possible.
Foreign  bank  sponsored and  non-bank  funds  concentrated  their  actual  influence  on  a
38 smaller number of companies  . The evidence suggests that the predominant reason  for
34 Due  to a fairly  stable state budget  there is no crowding  out effect in the Czech Republic.
35 Another  form of governance  can be exerted  via product  markets.  A precondition  for this type of
control  are unregulated  competitive  markets.
36 For a distinction  between  control  oriented  and arms'-length  finance  see Berglof  (1995).
37 An empirical  analysis  about  corporate  control  of banks is carried out in Cable  (1985).
38 As it  has been mentioned  above, the number of companies where the fund is represented in
relation to the total number of companies in the portfolio is generally higher for foreign bank
sponsored  and non bank funds  than for domestic  bank sponsored  funds  (see Table 14).29
domestic  banks  to  be  involved  in  the  investment  fund  business  is  to  develop  closer
relationships with existing or potential customers. This may reflect the desire of a domestic
bank to have better information and exert control on companies in which they hold debt
and to secure representation of at least one seat in a larger number of companies instead of
a controlling 20% stake in a smaller number of companies.
Table 19: Number  of companies  in which the fund is represented  on the board
CS  IB  CP  KB  AB  PPF  YSE  CA  HCC  ZB
Fund  category  11  DB  DB  DB  DB  DB  NB  DB  FB  NB  FB
Board  representations  333  240  162  138  136  88  ei  60  37  36
1/ DB=domestic  bank  sponsored;  FB=foreign  bank  sponsored;  NB=non-bank.
Remark:  for fund  names  see  Table  3.
Source:  Mejstrik  (1994)
Although banks are not actually direct owners of companies, they were able to  decrease
information asymmetries by increasing their governance options.  After the creation of a
two tier banking system, commercial banks have held most of the outstanding corporate
debt. The  introduction of  a  market economy  meant  that  a  large number of  firms  had
suddenly  become  unprofitable  and  some  might  not  be  able  to  survive.  As  court-led
bankruptcy  procedures  were  poorly  developed  and  the  overall  economic  and  legal
environment still rather uncertain, banks were likely to experience increasing difficulty in
controlling their loan portfolios. After voucher privatization, banks  used indirect equity
control  to  monitor  firms 39. Increased  corporate  governance of  banks  helped  to  reduce
information asymmetries between enterprises and outside suppliers of financing, reducing
the  risk  of  potential  failure  of  both  the  outstanding  loan  portfolio  and  new  lending
activities.  Although  the corporate  control efficiency of  domestic  bank sponsored  funds
might be lower than for funds of the other two categories, the close relationship resulting
from banks  being represented  on boards  of  portfolio companies  has  led to  significant
external monitoring in many Czech firms.
39 In the German  bank based system  the feature is slightly different.  Banks can hold equity stakes
in companies  and may increase  their influence  by using  proxy votes from small shareholders.30
Given  the  relationship  between  banks  and  funds,  it  is  less  surprising  that  SIS,  the
management company from Ceska Sporitelna, does not use bank staff to serve as directors
on boards of companies the fund owns (see above). Ceska Sporitelna, the Czech Savings
Bank, is one of the biggest financial institutions in the Czech Republic. While the bank
holds about half of the counitry's primary deposits, Ceska Sporitelna lends a rather small
share of its assets to the enterprise sector. Ceska Sporitelna is the predominant net lender
on the Czech interbank market because the bank has easy access to cheap resources and has
relatively little problems with bad loan portfolios. This is very much in contrast to other
big financial institutions in the Czech Republic such as Komercni and Investicni Banka
which hold 30% and  13% of total credit to the non-government sector respectively. This
might explain why Ceska Sporitelna is under relatively less pressure to monitor enterprises
with its  own staff. The 'informal links' between the bank and the management company
seem to be sufficient.
To sum up, the close relationship between banks and  investment funds is a spontaneous
development of Czech privatization which seems to go hand in hand with hardening budget
constraints in both the enterprise and the financial sector.
10.  Legal framework for voucher funds in the Czech Republic
In  the  Czech  Republic,  the  emergence  of  funds  began  with  the  establishment  of
40 management  companies  . Management  companies  were  established  to  carry  out
investment decisions on  investment funds in exchange  for a fee 41. In the first  wave of
privatization, both management companies and investment funds had to be set up as legal
persons: a management company could be organized as a joint stock company or a limited
liability company, whereas an investment fund was required to  have the legal form of a
40 The expression 'management  company' refers to the Czech term 'investicni spolecnost' (i.e.
investment  company)  that each management  company  had to include  in its business  name.
41Fees  charged by the management  company for the administration  of a fund's assets may not
exceed two percent  of the average  value of a fund's  portfolio  or 20% of a fund's profit.31
joint  stock  company 42. Some  management  companies  were  created  by  a  financial
institution (sponsor) and investment funds are therefore considered as 'bank affiliated'.
In the second wave of Czech privatization, however, investment funds could be set up as
joint  stock  companies  or  unit  trusts.  In contrast  to  a  fund  organized  as  a joint  stock
company, a unit trust is not a separate legal entity, and may be organized either as open-
end or closed-end funds. Thus, management companies in the second wave of privatization
in the Czech Republic had the possibility to choose among three legal options to set up a
fumd  (see Table 20).
Open-end funds must ensure enough liquidity to enable the redemption of investment fund
shares  for cash.  Due to  the illiquidity  of most  emerging  stock  markets  in Central  and
Eastern Europe, however, this would limit the ability of a fund to play an important role in
corporate restructuring. Unit trusts should therefore either be set up as closed-end funds or
as open-end funds with a restriction to redeem shares during an initial period (Blommestein
and Spencer, 1993, 28).
Table  20: Legal  form of investment  funds in the second  wave in the Czech  Republic
Legal  set  up  as:  joint  stock  closed-end  unit  open-end  unit  TOTAL
company  trust  trust
Number  of  funds  195  38  120  353
Number  of points  1,570  870  1,480  3,920
Source:  Mejstrik  (1994).
Organized  as  a  joint  stock  company,  a  fund  has  its  own  boards  (management  and
supervisory  board)  and  must  have an  annual  shareholder meeting.  Many  management
companies felt that annual shareholder meetings are costly, but do not offer real influence
to shareholders in annual meetings since the ownership of an  investment fund is widely
42 In Czech  the term 'investicni  fond' is only used for funds  having a legal person (organized  as a
joint stock company).  This is the reason why the designation  'investicni  fond' has to be included in
the business  name  of a fund organized  as a joint stock company.32
dispersed among the population. During fund interviews, representatives of management
companies  argued that  shareholders of  funds (former voucher holders)  would probably
receive higher dividends if funds were organized as unit trusts, since expenses are lower.
The important point is, however, that investors would loose their voting right under this
legal form (see Table 21).
Table 20 shows that many funds were set up as unit trusts in the second wave. Funds under
this  legal  form were  able to  acquire  more  points  than finds  organized  as joint  stock
companies. However, there is some doubt as to whether this is reallv due to the legal form.
Ultimately, it can be argued that exerting influence on the fund through voting rights seems
to be less important for investors participating in the voucher process. This development is
rather  surprising because shareholder voting rights  were considered to  be  an  important
element  of transparency  of the  voucher  process:  voucher  holders  that  invest  in  funds
become shareholders in funds with full voting rights (like individual investors). By having
a full voting right  shareholders have - at least  in theory - the ability to  influence the
management company or even cancel the contract with the management company.
It is worth stating at this point that there was a considerable preference for open-end funds
in the second wave. It may be due to the experience of the first wave after which shares of
investment funds continue to be traded at high discounts to their net asset value. Investors
therefore faced considerable difficulties in exchanging fund shares for the market price of
underlying assets. Thus, the option of redeeming shares at the management company for
the full value  of the portfolio  in cash  was a critical  factor for many investors  in their
decision about where to put their investment points. This proved to be true despite the fact
that  management  companies  offering open-end unit trusts  allowed  redemption of  fund
shares only after a transitional period of two to three years. This could be interpreted as a
belief  by  investors  that  stock  markets  could  not  become  liquid  enough  to  enable  the
exchange  of fund  shares  on the  secondary market  for  approximately  the  value  of  the
underlying assets.33
Table  21: Types  of funds  used  for voucher  privatization  in the Czech  and  Slovak  Republics
Criteria  Joint  stock  company  Closed-end  unit trust  Open-end  unit  trust
Legal  set-up  Fund  has its own legal  entity  with  Fund  has no legal  entity  Fund  has no legal  entity
own  governance  boards
Type of security  sold  share  fund  certificate  fund  certificate
Security  is held by  shareholder  investor  investor
Voting  right  full voting  right  1/  no voting  right  no voting  right
Capital  capital  is limited  to number  of  capital  is limited  to number  of  capital  is variable
points  invested  in the fund  (plus  points  invested  in the  fund
some  cash);  shareholders  can
decide  on capital  increase
Fungibility  shares  can  only  be sold  on  certificates  cannot be  exchanged  fund has to exchange  certificates
secondary  market  at the fund;  they  can be sold  only  against  cash
on the secondary  market
Administrative  cost  relatively  high  cost for organizing  lower  cost  than  shareholder  lower  cost  than shareholder
shareholder  meetings  for small  investment  fund,  possibility  for  investment  fund,  possibility  for
shareholders  higher  dividends  higher  dividends
1/  in case  of voting  shares;  shares  can also  be issued  as non-voting  shares,  but  they still remain  shares,  in contrast  to fund  certificates.
Related  Laws  in the Czech  and Slovak  Republics:  Law  No. 248  of May 29, 1992  about  investment  companies  and  investment  funds;  Law No. 591
of November  20, 1992  on securities  (bonds  and shares),  Law  No. 513  of January 1,  1992  (Commercial  Code).  See  Trade  Links  (1994).34
11.  Investment funds and privatization - Conclusions
Surely the lesson to be  learned from the analysis is that  investment funds in the Czech
Republic will be the predominant institutional players in equity control of privatized firms.
The survey in the Czech Republic shows that investment funds developed important steps
to become external monitors of firms.
Looking at investment funds by different fund category, one can observe that foreign bank
sponsored  funds  and  non-bank  funds  tend  to  have  more  concentrated  portfolios.
Monitoring  of  firms  by  these  two  fund  types  should  therefore  be  relatively  stringent
compared to domestic bank sponsored funds. In addition, one can see that shares owned by
foreign  bank  sponsored  and  non-bank  funds  performed  better  than  shares  owned  by
domestic bank sponsored funds.
However.,  it would be highly misleading to conclude that domestic bank sponsored funds
have a less important role to play in the post-privatization period. Rather, the opposite
conclusion should be drawn because domestic bank sponsored funds are represented on the
boards of considerably more companies than foreign bank sponsored and non-bank funds.
Banks tried to  establish closer customer relationships by being represented  in as  many
companies of affiliated investment funds. The creation of bank sponsored investment funds
can be regarded as a spontaneous institutional arrangement that emerged in an economy of
43 increasing uncertainty since the state was withdrawing more and more from the economy
The survey of the top ten funds in the Czech Republic shows a widespread use of bank
staff  to serve  as directors on boards  of companies owned by  domestic bank  sponsored
funds.  Continuous  bank  monitoring  on  the  boards  of  enterprises  generally  results  in
decreasing information asymmetries between banks and enterprises. Therefore, the Czech
system of corporate governance is to a large extent characterized by a bank control-oriented
monitoring process over enterprise restructuring. Banks control the equity of enterprises of
43 This situation  is sometimes  referred  to as a 'corporate  governance  vacuum';  see Berglof  (1995).35
affiliated funds although they are actually not the owner of enterprises. The resulting close
relationship  between  banks  and  enterprises  is  a  step  in  overcoming  capital  market
imperfections in the form of considerable principal agent problems which can be found in
many  countries  in  transition.  Moreover,  this  leads  to  more  efficient  loan  portfolio
evaluation, and to enterprise monitoring by external agents. The external control function
of  investment  funds has  to  be  stressed  since it  leads to  the  accessibility  of  corporate
information and to more transparency about corporate performance. In short, investment
funds in the Czech Republic have become predominant external owners resulting also in a
lower default risk in connection with bank lending. Therefore, investment funds prove to
be a helpful tool in reducing the overall risk of the financial system.
This  is very much in contrast to developments of privatization and post-privatization in
other Central European countries and Russia where companies are mainly under the control
of insiders (Frydman et al., 1993, 172). In Poland, insider control comes mainly from the
strong position of workers and labor unions, whereas in Hungary and Russia companies are
mainly under the control of management. While Russian privatization is often associated
with  voucher  privatization,  the  importance  of  the  voucher  scheme  in  the  overall
privatization  strategy,  as  well  as  the  environment  it  was  implemented  in,  were  very
different from mass privatization in the Czech case. In Russia, it seems that the voucher
scheme  was not  able to  counterbalance the  predominant  position of  management  and
workers  (Boycko  et  al.,  1994, 9).  Due  to  the lack  of  transparency,  insider-controlled
companies face substantial difficulties in raising external finance. In the Czech Republic,
however, the voucher scheme transferred most of the ownership rights to external owners.
In addition, the emergence of bank sponsored investment funds helped to reduce the risk
resulting from bad loan portfolios that banks inherited before they were privatized.
Reform experience in Central and Eastern Europe shows that the privatization of banks -
which is crucial for the development of a sound financial system - must go hand in hand
with mechanisms to cope with increased risk for investors in a post-privatization economy.
In  order  to  make  corporate  lending by  banks  effective, banks  must  develop  ways  to36
determine  different  levels  of  risk  associated  with  different  clients  or  projects.  Since
enterprises still have considerable difficulties in offering collateral in exchange for a bank
loan or a corporate  bond, banks will only engage in corporate  lending if they have the
ability to monitor the use of the loan. If this information screening process is too costly,
banks will stay away from corporate lending.
There is a long ongoing discussion in the Western academic world about bank based versus
market based financial systems. In the West both systems can work well as long as they
provide transparency and maintain low transaction cost for corporate finance. Whether both
systems will  work  in a  country  in  transition  which  is  characterized by  capital market
imperfections,  considerable  principal  agent  problems,  and  high  transaction  costs  for
external finance is less clear. Even in a country with a market based financial system like
that of the United States, recent research shows that enterprises that have a bank actively
monitoring  the  board  face  considerably  fewer  liquidity  constraints  for  investment  and
restructuring  than  enterprises  without this  close  relationship 44. The  evidence  from  the
Czech Republic suggests that investment funds can contribute to overcome capital market
imperfections in a transition economy.
It  is worth mentioning  that  investment funds emerged and  have been  running  without
major involvement of the state. The findings on Czech voucher privatization underscore
that an emerging market can develop its own mechanisms, permitting greater efficiency
once the state has sent clear signals and established adequate incentives. Polish plans  for
voucher privatization, which are characterized by a much higher degree of government
involvement in the activity of voucher funds compared to the Czech case, could lead to
vicious loops. This possibility must be stressed, since there prevails a widespread tendency
in reform policy for the government to set up new institutions and regulate them. In case of
difficulties,  people  will  always  put  pressure  on  the  government,  which  will  react  by
44 See Ramirez  (1994). For a broader  discussion  on the issue see Hoshi,  Kashyap,  and Scharfstein
(1990).37
increasing involvement, resulting in misleading signals and to decreasing credibility of the
45 reform process
What  is  the  role  of  investment  funds  in  corporate  governance  following  voucher
privatization?  In  order  to  answer  this  question,  one  should  first  discuss  what  can  be
expected from funds as institutional players in equity markets. This relates to the question
of  how to  address the  problem of  privatization  in general  and  the voucher  scheme in
particular.
The voucher scheme is a two phase model. The first is a pure transfer of ownership (often
related to 'paper privatization'). The quality of the new owner is of subordinate importance.
What is more important is cutting the link between the state bureaucracy and firms and the
introduction  of  hard  budget  constraints  in  enterprise  decision  making.  The  change  of
ownership to 'real' (strategic) 46 owners is carried out in a second phase. The key difference
between the voucher scheme and classical approaches to privatization like direct sale (for
example, in  Hungary)  is that  the search for strategic owners  in the voucher scheme is
carried  out  between  private  entities,  i.e.  between  potential  strategic  investors  and
investment funds or the stock exchange.
In classical  privatization, however,  the  strategic investor has  to  negotiate  with  a  state
bureaucracy. The privatization experience in Hungary shows that this approach is very time
consuming. Even in East Germany, which has considerable technical and financial support
from the Western part of that country, this process took about four years. In addition, the
political  instability throughout Central  Europe makes a  gradual case-by-case sell-off of
enterprises by a national holding company or privatization agency susceptible to lobbying
for continuous subsidies, soft credits, corruption and fraud.
45 For a view against  the government  being  an 'agent  of change' see also van Wijnbergen  (1993).
46 Here a strategic  owner is defined  as an owner with a certain  knowledge  of the industry,  bringing
management  capabilities,  product  technology  and new capital  to a company.38
What  should  therefore  be  expected  from  investment  funds  in  terms  of  corporate
governance? Many authors  argue that  'good'  owners, such as  strategic owners, should
actually run the company putting external governance somehow on the same level with
management.  In  other  words,  the  classical distinction  between  the  role  of  owners  as
principals and the management as agents becomes obsolete. Of course, acceptance of this
argument  means  that  investment  funds  will  always  perform  poorly  in  corporate
governance.
A better way of looking at this question is to evaluate funds by accepting them for what
they are, namely, financial investors. Their monitoring ability can be stronger or weaker
depending on the  stake in  a specific  company. In order  to  make an assessment  of  the
performance of  voucher funds in corporate  governance, the voucher  scheme should be
evaluated over its entire time horizon. From a shareholder perspective 'good' funds would
be the ones selling their shares to strategic investors at a  high price. In addition, funds
should monitor  their  companies  by  pointing out  to  managers  that external  owners are
interested  in  value  maximization  of  the  firm 47. If  the  funds  are  dissatisfied  with  the
incumbent  management their  task  is  to replace  the management  with  a  new one.  The
findings in this study show that Czech investment funds are strong enough to do so.
12.  Policy implications
The findings suggest that in the Czech Republic investment funds do take a more important
role in the governance of firms than one might  have imagined at the beginning of  the
privatization process. However, the efficiency of corporate governance needs  still to  be
improved. Two different developments come to mind. The first one relates to investment
funds in particular, the second one relates to the market for ownership rights in general.
47 For a theoretical  analysis  of the insider  problem  in transitional  economies  see Berglof  (1995) or
Frydman  and Rapaczynski  (1993).39
First,  funds could  (and  should)  become  stronger  monitors. The  activity  of  investment
banking is a new business in  countries in  transition. Therefore the  willingness and  the
capability of corporate governance of funds will improve because of the learning process.
Stronger governance can also be expected to result from changes in the legal environment.
Raising  a  fund's  maximum  ownership  above  20%  in  a  company  would  give  funds
additional incentives to stronger monitoring.
Second, stronger corporate governance could also be expected from funds (being financial
investors) selling shares to strategic investors. At present, an assessment of the transfer of
ownership from funds to potential strategic owners (either domestic or foreign) is rather
difficult, if not impossible because trading of shares is estimated to be carried out at 50%-
60% off-exchange in mid-1994 down from 90% in  199348 Off-exchange trading is only
being reported since 1995. Research in this area must wait until adequate data are available.
What remains to be done with regard to investment privatization funds? Two issues are
important to further improve the efficiency and the transparency of their activity:
I )  deregulation of limited fund ownership; and
2)  stronger publication requirements for funds.
There is much debate on whether to raise or lower a fund's  limit of 20% ownership in a
company. However, it seems clear that by raising or even removing this ceiling, funds will
have even greater incentive to monitor their portfolio companies. Under the current law, a
majority  vote  in  a  given  company  requires  at  least  three  investment  funds,  limiting
considerably  the  influence  of  a  single  fund.  Another  means  of  increasing  a  fund's
monitoring  ability  would  be  to  introduce  proxy  voting  at  the  annual  meeting  of
shareholders4, further concentrating the dispersed ownership of individual shareholders.
48 Author's estimate  based  on various interviews  with local brokers.
49  For an empirical analysis on the influence of ownership patterns on the share price see
Claessens  (1995).40
With regard to  strengthening publication  requirements, funds are at present  still rather
reluctant to publish information about their portfolios, in contrast to Western funds that use
portfolio  information  as  a  marketing  instrument  resulting  in  greater  confidence  of
investors. Because portfolio publication of funds generally lacks detailed information of
the size of ownership in companies and net asset values are published without any external
control  on  methods  of  calculation,  it  would  be  reasonable  to  assume  that  detailed
information for market participants is the most efficient method to avoid bad surprises in a
rapidly  changing  environment 50. Therefore,  it  is  suggested  that  funds provide  detailed
information on their portfolios at least every three months. How could that be enforced?
One could consider a government agency to  regulate funds. However, a  self-regulatory
organization might be more efficient since there is a high degree of competition  among
funds.  Groups  of  dynamic  funds  could  perhaps  found  an  institution  that  publishes
information on the  participating funds.  The ones  that  do not  participate  would  face a
negative reputation in the market and be considered 'outsiders'. Funds willing to participate
in  the  self-regulatory  organization  could gain  a  comparative  advantage  from  showing
activities with greater transparency.
The findings in the survey suggest a review of the banking reform in Central and Eastern
Europe  may  be  necessary.  Although  the  recapitalization  of  commercial  banks  is  an
important element in improving the banking system, this reform sets the wrong incentives
when it is not parallel to bank privatization. Without shifting bank ownership from the state
to private individuals, recapitalization will fail since the governments can not credibly rule
out  the  possibility  of  future  recapitalization.  This  moral  hazard  problem  has  been
particularly  apparent  in  Hungary  where  the commercial banks  have  been recapitalized
several times  (incurring  considerable  cost  for  the  state  budget)  without  changing  the
underlying incentive structure under which banks operate 51.
50  This relates to the question: how could the crisis with regard to the Russian investment  fund
MMM  have been  avoided?
51  See also Borish  et al. (1995),  and van Wijnbergen  (1993).41
By contrast, one of the most important features of Czech privatization was to introduce
hard budget constraints in both the commercial and the financial sectors by privatizing state
banks and firms simultaneously. In former centrally planned economies, state-owned banks
acted as accounting offices for directed loan programs of the government and the central
bank. There is a crucial relationship between restructuring of banks and enterprises. The
state-owned  accounting  offices  will  only  become  real  banks  when  enterprises  are
privatized, and enterprises will only feel pressure to restructure when the activity of banks
is based on  sound credit  evaluation. A necessary precondition for success is to  change
incentives of both banks and enterprises by privatizing them. The Czech experience shows
that banks can be privatized via vouchers even though their financial condition and bad
loans were not yet entirely resolved. Once privatized, Czech banks started to improve their
efficiency, managing their loan portfolio by exerting control over enterprises of affiliated
investment funds. Since banks are economic actors outside of enterprises they can play an
important role as external monitors and counterbalance the strong position of managers
inside  the  enterprises.  This  decreases  information  asymmetries  between  banks  and
enterprises  and  leads  to  higher  transparency  about  corporate  performance.  This  is
especially  important  for  transition  economies  since  information  is  scarce,  external
enforcement mechanisms in court are poorly developed or non-existent, and management
tends to hide important enterprise data and to transfer assets for their own purposes after
decades  under  central  planning.  Lower  information  screening  costs  for  enterprise
investment plans are therefore a crucial element in making investments  in restructuring
work where internal funds are insufficient.42
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14.  Appendix
Table  22: Investment  characteristics  of enterprises  (in number  of enterprises)
Size  of  enterprise  1/  Small  Medium  Large  Total
Individual  investors  751  527  213  1491
(in % of points  used)  13  30  57  100
Investment  funds by size  2/
Small  funds  335  126  9  470
(in % of total  number  of enterprises)  71  27  2  100
Medium  size  funds  470  380  99  949
(in % of total number  of enterprises)  50  40  10  100
Large  funds  291  368  165  824
(in  % of total  number  of enterprises)  35  45  20  100
Prices  3/  |
High  price  220  88  36  344
(in % of total  number  of enterprises)  64  26  10
Medium  price  340  254  97  691
(in % of total number  of enterprises)  49  37  14
Low  price  138  142  59  339
(in % of total  number  of enterprises)  41  42  17
Average  Price (in  shares  per points)  0.054  0.078  0.086  0.071
1/  enterprise  sizes are defined  as (in number  of shares  of  equity):  small  (less  than 100,000),
medium  (between  100,000  and 1,000,000  shares),  large  (greater  than 1,000,000).
2/ IPF sizes  are defined  as [in number  of investment  points  acquired]:  small  (less  than 100,000),
medium  (between  100,000  and 1,000,000  shares),  large  (greater  than 1,000,000).
3/ prices  are defined  as (in number  of shares  per investment  points,  which  means  that smaller
numbers  refer to higher  prices): high  (less  than  0.015  or 3 shares  per 200 points),  medium  (>
0.015  or 3 shares  per 200 points  and < 0.08  or 16  shares  per 200 points),  low  (more  than  0.08  or
16  shares  per 200  points).
Sources:  Shafik  (1993)  and  S. Claessens  (the  World  Bank, internal  calculations).Policy Research Working Paper Series
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